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When looking at the current pace and progress of
international climate negotiations, option 3 (‘die’)
seems humankind’s most likely fate. But hopefully
that only is a false perception.False is also the trade-
off implied by the heading above.There is no doubt
that we have to invest in both adaptation and miti-
gation. Nevertheless, the question is legitimate as it
deals with the emphasis of our efforts. Ultimately,
managing the problem of climate change will require
the weighing of different kinds of risks arising from
climate change, adaptation and mitigation.
The climate challenge
Climate change poses a permanent and serious threat
to human development and prosperity. With rising
temperatures, climate change is likely to become
unmanageable and catastrophic, pushing Earth’s
complex ecology past known and as yet unknown tip-
ping points, which may fundamentally and irre-
versibly alter the way our planet functions. Summer
minima of the Arctic Sea ice have been decreasing at
alarming rates in recent years. The Greenland ice
sheet,which stores enough ice to raise global sea lev-
els by seven meters,has become a highly sensitive tip-
ping point.Other potential tipping points include the
West Antarctic ice sheet, boreal forests, the Amazon
rainforest and the Indian summer monsoon. Key
impacts of climate change include flooding of coastal
areas and river deltas, more intense droughts and
desertification, increased occurrence of extreme
weather events, and water scarcity due to melting
glaciers and changing precipitation patterns. The
impacts of climate change can threaten basic human
needs, in particular food and safe shelter. Climatic
risks can destroy the livelihoods of many, triggering
large-scale migrations and inducing or exacerbating
national and international conflicts. Climate change
is a major obstacle to poverty reduction objectives
and achievement of the Millennium Development
Goals (Parry et al. 2007).
In light of these dangers, the European Union has
formulated the objective of limiting global warming
to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. While no level of
climate change is inherently ‘safe’, estimates of the
temperature thresholds suggest that the 2°C target
will be sufficient to avoid triggering intermediately
sensitive tipping elements such as the West Antarctic
ice sheet, El Niño/Southern oscillation, Indian sum-
mer monsoon circulation, Amazon rainforest and
boreal forests (Lenton et al. 2008). The 2°C target,
however, bears the risk of being insufficient for
avoiding a melting of the Greenland ice sheet. For
the highly sensitive Arctic sea ice, the tipping point
may have even been already passed. In fact, new
research indicates that the risks from any given glob-
al temperature increase have been underestimated
(Smith et al. 2009). Scientists also misjudged the dif-
ficulty of limiting temperature increases because the
climate system already contains more warming
potential than previously assumed. Greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions are increasing at a faster pace
(Raupach et al. 2007), the oceans’ capacity to
sequester carbon is decreasing (Canadell et al. 2007)
and the temporary cooling effects of aerosols in the
atmosphere are likely to diminish as more stringent
clean air policies are applied (Ramanathan and Feng
2008). Thus the likelihood of global warming in the
21st century even beyond the threshold of a 2.4°C
increase is dangerously high (Schellnhuber 2008).
2 degrees – 2 tasks
No matter at which temperature level governments
finally manage to ‘land’ the planet, human settle-
ments will need to adapt to residual climate change.CESifo Forum 3/2009 15
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Keeping the 2°C threshold, an extremely ambitious
target, implies global warming three times as much
as has been observed in the past 200 years.
Managing the unavoidable and avoiding the unman-
ageable are two sides of the same coin.Yet, adapta-
tion and mitigation are sometimes seen as alterna-
tive policy options, suggesting that it suffices to
implement either of them. This view, however,
neglects some fundamental differences between
mitigation and adaptation in terms of their spatial
and temporal dimension. Mitigation of climate
change can reduce the impacts of climate change on
all systems across the globe and it is certain to be
effective.Many mitigation activities have immediate
side benefits such as reducing air pollution or pro-
tecting biodiversity. But the climatic benefits of mit-
igation take several decades to fully manifest them-
selves because of the inertia of the global climate
system.
Adaptation, in contrast, is the only option to
reduce climate impacts in the near future. It can
be implemented locally or regionally, and it can
generate valuable synergies with the reduction of
current climate-sensitive risks. Unlike mitigation,
the benefits of adaptation accrue locally in the
targeted regions and sectors. Its scope is limited
(e.g. it is hard to imagine how to protect the
Maldives against a 5m sea-level rise) and its effec-
tiveness uncertain (e.g. dykes and levees can
break). Last but not least, it puts the burden on
those most vulnerable to climate change, which
stands in stark contrast to the polluter-pays prin-
ciple. Ultimately, managing the problem of cli-
mate change will require the weighing of different
kinds of costs and benefits arising from adaptation
and mitigation.
Managing the unavoidable
Limiting global warming to 2°C is likely to defend
critical tipping points in the earth system but signifi-
cant impacts on human life will still occur. These
include, among others, more and stronger extreme
weather events, heat waves, water stress, failing har-
vests and a widespread loss of biodiversity.
Most adaptation actions yield short- to mid-term
benefits for those implementing them and, as a
result, they often occur autonomously. Insurance
companies adjust their premiums in response to
changing weather risks, farmers change their prac-
tices in response to failing harvests, water managers
invest in additional water storage capacity due to
decreasing precipitation, and health managers
update vaccination recommendations in line with
changing disease patterns. Nevertheless, it would be
wrong to conclude that adaptation can largely be left
to market-driven actions of self-interested agents.
There are three main reasons why governments and
international organizations have an important role
to play here.
First, adaptation by self-interested actors pays no
attention to equity issues such as differential respon-
sibility for climate change and capacity to adapt. If
adaptation was left to the markets, wealthy commu-
nities would be able to prepare themselves against
the detrimental impacts of climate change.Poor soci-
eties would have to bear the unmitigated impacts of
climate change that was largely caused by others.
This outcome, denoted as ‘climate apartheid’ by
Nobel Peace Laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu, is
unacceptable from a moral point of view.
Second, effective adaptation at global, regional and
local levels often depends on the accessible informa-
tion about current and future climate change and its
likely impacts; on guidelines for the inclusion of cli-
mate change risks into current decision procedures;
and on the availability of technologies that are
robust against a wide range of climatic conditions.
Much of this knowledge is most effectively supplied
by governments or international organizations. One
example for a provider of this kind of information is
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), whose reports and main datasets are freely
available.
Third, governments are engaged in many climate-
sensitive activities. They build and operate trans-
port and water-related infrastructure, they run
weather services and agricultural outreach agen-
cies, they establish poverty reduction strategies,
building norms and water-allocation rules, they
regulate food processing and insurance industries
and run national parks, public health services and
disaster preparedness agencies, and they provide
international development assistance. These cli-
mate-sensitive activities are generally governed
by direct regulation rather than by market forces.
In the end, decision-making bodies and executive
agencies need to explicitly assess and consider
the significance of climate change in all their
activities.CESifo Forum 3/2009 16
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Avoiding the unmanageable
Is it possible to stabilize the global climate system at
reasonable economic cost? If the past 200 years of
human development may serve as an indicator, cli-
mate change cannot be halted without sacrificing
world economic growth.In the past,the accumulation
of physical capital stocks and the accumulation of car-
bon emissions in the atmosphere have gone hand in
hand. The combustion of fossil fuels has been at the
heart of wealth creation ever since the industrial revo-
lution changed the face of our planet. This is why
many economies in transition feel that they are not
only challenged by dangerous climate change but also
by ‘dangerous emission reductions’. The mitigation
challenge lies in developing an economy that decou-
ples growth in capital stocks from that in emissions.
Overcoming the tragic trade-off between economic
growth and climate protection is the ultimate goal.
This is especially important for developing countries
who cannot afford to forego economic growth for the
sake of climate protection.A precondition for a new,
low-carbon growth path for the world economy is
massive investments in new energy technologies.
In recent years, modeling exercises (with integrated
economy-energy-climate models that feature an
improved formulation of endogenous technological
change) have shown that the cost of climate stabi-
lization can be indeed modest. In a comparison of
several leading integrated assessment models, the
Report on Energy and Climate Policy in Europe
(RECIPE)1 found that the ‘gross’ cost of stabilizing
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at 450ppm
(parts per million) do not exceed 1.4 percent of
global GDP upto 2100.2 REMIND, an integrated
economy-energy-climate model
developed at the Potsdam Insti-
tute for Climate Impact Re-
search, shows costs of less than
0.6 percent of global GDP for the same time hori-
zon. These relatively moderate mitigation costs are
based on the assumption that the world community
immediately starts a comprehensive transition
towards a low-carbon economy. Figure 1 presents
how costs escalate if action is not immediate (i.e.
certain countries delay participation) or compre-
hensive (i.e. certain technological options are
excluded). Delaying global action until 2020 boosts
mitigation cost by 72 percent compared to the refer-
ence scenario.If Annex I countries along with China
and India start mitigation in 2010 and the rest of the
world (ROW) follows a business-as-usual path until
2020, costs increase by only 2 percent. Similarly,
costs will rise by 124 percent if the expansion of
renewable energy sources is not pushed beyond
business-as-usual expansion rates. Abstaining from
a ‘renaissance’ in nuclear power, in contrast, will 
not substantially increase global mitigation costs 
(+ 7 percent).
Another energy-economy model comparison exer-
cise suggests that the costs of an ambitious low-sta-
bilization scenario of 400ppm CO2 equivalent lie
below 2.5 percent of GDP upto 2100 (Knopf et al.
2008). This low-stabilization scenario is believed to
have a relatively high chance of safeguarding the 2°C
target.Overall,this suggests that costs of limiting the
rise of global mean temperature to 2°C can be rela-
tively moderate if effective policies and technologies
are put into place on a global scale.Given that major
impacts of climate change regarding tipping ele-
ments and ecosystem changes may be avoided when
limiting global warming to 2°C, this appears to be a
reasonable target for an international climate policy
framework.
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1 RECIPE is an in-depth international
comparison of energy-economy models
carried out at the Potsdam Institute for
Climate Impact Research (Germany)
together with Centro Euro-Mediterraneo
per i Cambiamenti Climatici (Italy) and
Centre International pour l’Environne-
ment et le Développement (France). The
project assesses global mitigation options
and costs on regional and sectoral levels.
First results will be made available in
Autumn 2009.
2 The gross costs of climate stabilization
are calculated as the difference between
the path of GDP without climate policy
(business-as-usual) and the GDP path with
climate policy.This ignores the benefits of
climate protection in form of damages
avoided; hence ‘gross’ cost. Costs are dis-
counted with 3 percent per year.CESifo Forum 3/2009 17
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A Global Contract3
Achieving the 2°C target will require an institution-
al framework that can deliver on the criteria of
environmental effectiveness (reducing emissions in
accordance with the 2°C limit), economic efficiency
(doing so at least costs), and equity (taking into
account different responsibilities and capabilities in
mitigating and responding to climate change).
Along these lines,we propose a Global Contract on
Climate Change that focuses on four major issues:
establishing a global carbon market, fostering the
development and sharing of low carbon technolo-
gies, reducing emissions from deforestation and
land degradation (REDD), and setting up a frame-
work for addressing adaptation. Such a Global
Contract represents a guiding vision that can be
implemented via a set of policy roadmaps that
eventually merge into an integrated climate policy
architecture.
First, a  global carbon market based on tradable
emission permits internalizes the social costs of
emitting greenhouse gases. As the debate on the
Green Paradox has shown,even an optimal carbon
tax cannot ensure a socially optimal extraction
pathway for fossil fuels (Sinn 2008; Edenhofer and
Kalkuhl 2009). A comprehensive cap-and-trade
system is necessary to guide private investment
into a socially desirable direction. At the same
time, the auctioning of emission permits provides
governments with funds for public investments in
infrastructure, education, research and develop-
ment.
For maximum efficiency,the emerging price should
stretch across all sectors and countries. A global
trading system may be implemented via UNFCCC
negotiations or bottom-up by the linking of region-
al schemes in the context of the International
Carbon Action Partnership. Ideally, these ap-
proaches will complement each other. But bottom-
up linking can be a fallback option if a more com-
prehensive approach turns out to be politically
infeasible during the December 2009 Copenhagen
negotiations. The precise institutional require-
ments for a global carbon market are challenging
and deserve further exploration (see Flachsland et
al. 2009).
Second, low-carbon technologies help to de-car-
bonize our energy systems. However, market fail-
ures related to the specific circumstances of tech-
nological innovation exist which prevent the large-
scale uptake of sustainable energy sources. For
this reason,it is important to understand that even
a well-designed carbon market is not sufficient on
its own to encourage the fundamental energy sys-
tem transformation we aim for. Although many
renewable energy technologies or carbon capture
and storage (CCS), given stringent carbon con-
straints, are likely to be profitable in the mid-to
long-term, most of them fail to attract funding
because their realization requires large invest-
ments in infrastructure.Additional policies such as
enhanced funding for developing low-carbon tech-
nologies, pilot projects for complex technologies
such as CCS and market introduction programs
for renewable energy sources need to be put in
place.
The investment requirements are significant and
benefit all countries.Therefore, industrialized coun-
tries should shoulder the research and development
effort together by agreeing on a burden sharing for
the introduction of low-carbon technologies. In
addition, a sustainable energy provision for devel-
oping countries is of key importance for a long-term
and global solution of the climate problem and
comes with numerous ancillary local and regional
benefits. Mainstreaming low-carbon development
into development policy, promoting sharing of tech-
nologies and setting up a low-carbon fund for least
developed countries and regions could help poor
countries to leapfrog directly into a modern low-
carbon economy.
Third,deforestation and forest degradation accounts
for roughly 20 percent of global anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions. According to most esti-
mates, these emissions can be reduced at low costs.
Also, REDD comes with significant ancillary eco-
nomic benefits due to the preservation of ecosys-
tems and their services. Important challenges in
establishing an environmentally effective REDD
regime lie in ensuring permanence of forest conser-
vation and limiting leakage. Funding for forest
preservation would stimulate the economies of
developing countries and ensure that local popula-
tions do not respond to the downturn by accelerat-
ing the present overexploitation of their natural re-
sources.
3 The blue print for a Global Contract has been developed at
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Edenhofer et al.
2008) and was launched during a conference hosted by the
European Parliament in November 2008. More information is
available under www.global-contract.eu.CESifo Forum 3/2009 18
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Fourth, even if the most ambitious mitigation target
can be realized, adaptation to unavoidable climate
change will be required. The funding necessary to
finance adaptation is significant, especially in the
developing world. As the adaptation fund set up
under the Kyoto Protocol is inadequate in meeting
these needs, a broadened funding mechanism needs
to be installed in order to provide a sufficient and
reliable financial basis for adaptation activities in
developing countries.
As a conclusion, the Global Contract should define
the rights and responsibilities of all nations and allo-
cate the burden of mitigation and adaptation in an
effective, efficient and equitable manner. The con-
tract must be effective in addressing climate change
and bringing down greenhouse gas emissions.It must
be efficient so that scarce resources are used to the
greatest benefit. And it must be equitable by
acknowledging the common but differentiated
responsibility among rich and poor countries and by
advancing economic prosperity and adaptive capaci-
ty in the underdeveloped world.After all, we do not
have the luxury to choose between adaptation and
mitigation; we have to do both.
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